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Editorial
Implementing International 
Obligations to Clear Mines
by Stuart Casey-Maslen
E ach State Party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) that knows or suspects it has areas under its jurisdiction or control that contain 
anti-personnel (AP) mines has a clear deadline to locate and 
destroy those mines. According to Article 5(1), upon becom-
ing party to the APMBC, a State must complete clearance 
within ten years, unless the deadline is pushed back in an 
agreement from the other States Parties at an annual meeting 
or five-yearly review conference.1 
The nature of the obligation is to make every effort to find 
all mined areas with AP mines in areas located on sovereign 
territory or on territory a State effectively controls abroad. 
Once a suspected mined area is confirmed as contaminated, 
the State Party must then destroy all the AP mines contained 
therein. In practice, however, all does not really mean all. This 
is the understandable result of technological constraints allied 
to the explicit introduction of risk-management methodology 
into demining operations. Detection technology limits the 
depth at which AP mines, especially those with minimum-
metal content, will be identified. Mines that lie more than a 
dozen or so centimeters below the surface will likely remain 
undetected; however, some may rise in the months or years 
following clearance operations, presenting an ongoing threat 
to life and limb. Similarly, a decision must be taken as to 
which areas are subjected to full clearance and at which point 
this will start and end. The result of this decision may be that 
actual contamination is unwittingly overlooked. 
In reality, the problem with demining is less that adjacent 
areas contaminated with mines are missed. Far more often, 
operations focus and persist in areas that palpably are 
not contaminated with explosive devices, which impede 
efficiency. Poor survey techniques and fear of legal liability in 
some instances meant that operators and national programs 
have eschewed risk-management methods in favor of ultra-
cautious (and ultra-expensive) approaches. Any ongoing mine 
clearance operation that does not locate a single mine (or other 
explosive threat) within ten days should ask itself whether it is 
working in the right place.
But while many States Parties seem to regard time as an 
infinite resource, funds—whether national or international—
are most assuredly not. Even without the dictates of financial 
austerity and blossoming budget deficits, funding for mine 
clearance operations would already be in decline. The increas-
ingly steep decline that we are currently witnessing will only 
accelerate in coming years, though major support for specif-
ic operations will likely still be available in case of overriding 
humanitarian need (e.g., should peace break out in Syria).
What does this mean for the implementation of the 
APMBC? 
First, the generosity of extension periods with which States Parties have too 
frequently rewarded sluggishness and inefficiency must come 
to an end. Granting long extensions to laggard programs 
scarcely encourages positive change. Moreover, if a State Party 
is willfully failing to make every effort to confirm mined 
areas and then clear them “as soon as possible” (as Article 5 
demands), they should not be granted an extension.1 The legal 
reality should reflect the political and operational realities: 
that a State Party is in violation both of the APMBC and of 
international law. The notion of State responsibility means 
that a State should indeed be held responsible for its actions 
and its inaction. The current approach of the States Parties 
is to reward failure and willful inaction, hardly one that is 
conducive to encourage accountability and responsibility. 
“Any ongoing mine clearance operation that does not locate 
a single mine (or other explosive threat) within ten days 
should ask itself whether it is working in the right place.”
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Second, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) needs to up its game 
materially. The new director, recently appointed, should ensure 
that extension requests are not just checked for formalist and 
procedural issues, but also that the review assesses whether 
the data is robust and coherent, and that the associated plans 
are ambitious and evidence-based. One 2016 extension request 
that was on the cusp of being submitted, and which the ISU 
reviewed, contained an unacceptable number of logical 
blunders and glaring mathematical errors. To ensure this does 
not reoccur, States must support the ISU with the necessary 
financial, human, and technical resources and requisite 
mandate to enable the ISU to do its work professionally.
Third, oversight of demining programs in affected States Parties needs to be 
enhanced. This is a task for donor States and operational ex-
perts. It is time the cooperative duty to facilitate and clarify 
compliance under APMBC Article 8(1) is applied directly to 
operations. With the consent of the territorial State, a mission 
of experts is an informal mechanism and no threat to sover-
eignty; a State Party that has nothing to hide should seek to 
hide nothing. Every year two or three States, especially those 
imminently seeking an extension, could be assessed without 
significant financial outlay on anyone’s part and then support-
ed where necessary.
Fourth, it is a regrettable reality that while lip service is paid to land 
release, in many programs the risk-management processes 
inherent in the concept are, in the words of Hamlet, “more 
honor’d in the breach than in the observance.” Although land-
mine impact survey methodology has received the last rites, 
the wilder estimates of massive, widespread contamination 
and devastating impact that it falsely generated still call to us 
from beyond the grave. Today, far too few States can proffer a 
rational estimate of contamination based on confirmed and 
not just suspected mined areas. This is even the case in States 
with demining programs that have been ongoing for two de-
cades or longer. Investing in high-quality non-technical sur-
vey is a major operational requirement, not an optional extra. 
From 28 November to 2 December 2016, States Parties and 
States not yet party to the APMBC will convene in Santiago, 
Chile, for the fifteenth meeting of the States Parties. Will it be 
business as usual? Another triumph of diplomatic form over 
operational substance? Or will States Parties finally grasp the 
mettle and resolve to make the Maputo Review Conference 
pledge of well-nigh completing global clearance by 2025 an 
operational reality?  
See endnotes page 67
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